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Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality
of Regulatory Decision-Making
Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop
Abstract
Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory
agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies
relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators
do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive mea-
sure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 OECD countries,
and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence
has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal
political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it
increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work
is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover
effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.
1 Introduction
In a process beginning in the 1970s, and accelerating through the 1990s, countries across the
world delegated policy competences to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) (e.g., Majone,
1997; Gilardi, 2005; Jordana et al., 2011). Such agencies operate under the authority of ap-
pointed rather than elected officials, and are insulated from electoral pressure. The creation of
IRAs developed unevenly across countries and policy areas, with the United States being the
policy innovator, and financial regulators and competition authorities being among the first
to be established, followed later by utility and social regulators (Jordana et al., 2011, 1346).
Decisions to delegate to IRAs partially resulted from policy diffusion by means of emulation
or the social construction of necessary institutional choices (Gilardi 2005; Jordana et al. 2011).
As such, the intellectual argument for their establishment in each country was never fully
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articulated from first principles. To the extent that agency creation was explicitly justified, the
central argument was that IRAs were able to make more efficient and effective policy decisions
than politicians and government departments, either because of their superior expertise and
skills, or because of certain biases or deficiencies present in decision-making by democratically
elected officials (Majone 1999; Gilardi 2002).
Studies of IRAs have concentrated on the factors that account for formal independence, of-
ten looking at the role of political and market-making functional imperatives (Majone 1997;
Gilardi 2002; Elgie and McMenamin 2005). From a normative perspective, though, this focus
on initial delegation seems to miss the point. Delegation to IRAs weakens the link between
the exercise of state power and voters, and leads to an increase in the power of unelected
technocrats. The standard justification of the existence of IRAs rests on their “superior perfor-
mance [...] relative to the result that would be likely if elected politicians were to perform the
functions themselves” (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, 18). Yet, in an era in which few if any
maintain the Saint-Simonian belief that technocratic decision-making is inherently better than
democratic decision-making, the reduction of democratic legitimacy requires some evidence
that IRAs do in fact exercise authority in such a superior fashion. That is, we need evidence
on whether or not granting (more) independence to IRAs results in better quality work.
Such evidence is hard to come by. Quality is an inherently evaluative and synoptic concept.
As such, scholars who are hesitant to use evaluative criteria because of the potential of serious
disagreement will seek to avoid investigating quality per se. At most, they will look at discrete
quantifiable improvements related to stated goals within a sector. Indeed, previous research
has assessed how IRAs promote particular desirable outcomes, such as higher network pen-
etration and lower interconnect rates in telecommunications (Wallsten, 2001; Gutiérrez, 2003;
Edwards and Waverman, 2006), more financial stability in banking (Jordana and Rosas, 2014),
and greater financial leverage in a range of sectors (Bortolotti et al., 2011).
Yet, the use of outcome measures has important drawbacks. Not only are quantifiable mea-
sures associated with gaming and neglect of other objectives (Hood and Bevan, 2006), but they
are also affected by much more than the regulation involved, which makes identifying the
specific contribution of independence challenging. In many instances, IRA creation diffused
rapidly, and, in the case of network industries, was concomitant with sectoral liberalization,
which makes it extremely difficult to disentangle the effect of IRAs from that of other changes
occurring at the same time. In statistical terms, the few post-liberalization data points before
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the IRA is created exert considerable leverage. In practical terms, it is difficult to imagine
many liberalized European markets existing without an independent sectoral regulator.
In this study, we seek to provide evidence on the link between political independence and
regulatory quality by focusing on one particular area of regulation: competition policy, or “the
set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in
a way that is detrimental to society” (Motta, 2004, 30). Competition policy is inherent to the
mixed economy, aiming primarily at market correction rather than creation. This allows us
to minimize the risk that our findings depend critically on the way in which regulation was
used to create new markets after liberalization.
We seek to improve on previous literature in three respects. First, in line with a growing body
of literature in economics and political science, we view independence as a matter of degree
rather than as a quality which is either present or absent (see, e.g., Cukierman et al., 1992; Gi-
lardi, 2002; Hanretty and Koop, 2012; Selin, 2015). We accordingly reframe arguments linking
political independence and regulatory quality so that they make sense when independence is
conceived in this way.
Second, besides independence, we take into consideration accountability, the second most dis-
cussed institutional feature of regulators. Accountability provisions are relevant for all policy
actors, but they are particularly important for IRAs. As they combine rule-making, enforce-
ment and adjudication, IRAs have a special duty to give account for their actions (Majone
1999; cf. Scott 2000; Maggetti et al. 2013). Accountability also matters for performance. It may
not only reduce the likelihood of misuse and abuse of political power, but may also enhance
the accuracy of information gathering and analysis (Patil et al., 2014). This is why several
authors have emphasized the need for regulators to be accountable as well as independent
(e.g., Majone, 1999; Quintyn and Taylor, 2007; Busuioc, 2009). We therefore assess the impact
of independence as well as accountability, distinguishing the two concepts conceptually and
empirically, and analyzing new data on the formal political independence and accountability
of competition authorities.
Third, we use a comprehensive proxy measure of regulatory quality – in our case, the quality
of competition policy enforcement – which is produced by an external company (the Global
Competition Review or GCR) based on expert opinion and additional data. The measure
centres on the enforcement process, capturing the quality of the work done by competition
authorities, including their economic and legal analyses and their intermediate output. Con-
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sequently, we are able to focus on the contribution of the authorities themselves, rather than
on certain market outcomes which are affected by many other factors. The data on regulatory
quality allow us to assess the impact on quality of the formal independence and accountability
of competition authorities in 30 member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), for the period 2005-2014. The results of our ordered probit regres-
sion of regulatory quality show that independence indeed improves quality. However, the
effect of accountability is not in the hypothesized direction, raising questions of institutional
design and the role of accountability more generally.
2 Independence and regulatory quality
Independence is the most commonly discussed characteristic of IRAs. The concept serves
two purposes in the literature. First, it demarcates the scope of the genus: a regulator must
be independent in some minimal sense to be considered an IRA. For Thatcher, for instance,
the minimum requirements for categorization as an IRA comprise: “(1) that the agency has
its own powers and responsibilities given under public law; (2) that it is organizationally
separated from ministries; and (3) that it be neither directly elected nor managed by elected
officials” (2005, 352; cf. Majone 1999, 2; Jordana et al. 2011, 1351). Second, the concept of
independence allows us to differentiate within the category of IRAs. That is, independence is
a matter of degree, with some regulators being more independent than others.
In this study, we focus on political independence, or the independence of regulators from
elected politicians and members of government. In concentrating on political independence,
we do not mean to imply that independence from other actors – and from the regulated sector
in particular – is unimportant; merely that it is independence from politics that is implied
by the literature, justifying the creation of IRAs. By the political independence of an agency,
we mean “the degree to which the agency takes day-to-day decisions without the interference
of politicians in terms of the offering of inducements or threats and/or the consideration of
political preferences” (Hanretty and Koop, 2013, 196).
Political independence defined this way is a property of agencies’ behavior, or what actually
happens. It is common in the literature to make a distinction between formal and actual
independence, or between what is true de jure and de facto. This has been the case since the
early literature on de jure and de facto central bank independence (Cukierman et al., 1992).
We concentrate on formal, or de jure independence, which we conceptualize as the degree to
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which there are statutory provisions that decrease the possibilities for politicians to influence
agency decisions before they are made. We focus on formal independence because this is
the feature of IRAs that can most easily be ‘engineered’, and because there is considerable
evidence linking grants of formal independence to higher degrees of actual independence,
at least in established democracies (e.g., Hanretty and Koop 2013; Ennser-Jedenastik 2015).
Nonetheless, our findings do not automatically translate to de facto independence.
How then should we expect formal independence and regulatory quality to be related? Al-
though early studies of independent regulatory commissions in the United States already
associated independence with higher levels of professionalism, consistency and policy con-
tinuity (see Bernstein, 1955, Ch. 5), most theorization of the link has been done in recent
decades. Two main causal arguments have been put forward: an expertise-based and a credi-
ble commitment-based argument.
The argument from expertise maintains that, compared to politicians and government depart-
ments, independent agencies have better access to (or can better process) information, and that
better information leads to better work. Though bureaucrats generally have better information
than politicians, this does not explain why bureaucrats in an independent agency should have
better information than bureaucrats in a government department and drawn from a career
civil service. To explain this, we have to examine the act of delegation.
Bawn (1995) explains that in setting the level of agency independence, politicians also make
decisions about the administrative procedures agencies may employ, and these procedures
may limit the information available to the agency, and the ability to assess policy consequences
and make decisions based on expertise. Although the examples Bawn gives are drawn from
the study of executive agencies in the United States, initial decisions about grants of inde-
pendence have also affected the ability of IRAs in Europe to draw on expertise. Limitations
may come through obligations to consult with the more generalist and political leadership of
government departments, but also through restrictions on the use of outside consultancies or
on the hiring of short-term experts.
This claim has been challenged. Gailmard and Patty (2007) argue that the link between in-
dependence and expertise is conditional on bureaucratic selection and retention: only policy-
motivated “zealots” protected by long tenure will invest in expertise, whereas other agency
staff (“slackers”) will not because of a lack of incentives. That is, bureaucratic expertise is
costly to develop and relationship-specific, while the specific relationship may not continue.
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Though these findings have some relevance for IRAs, we expect the effect of independence to
be stronger for these bodies as the relevant (regulatory) expertise is less relationship-specific
than is assumed by Gailmard and Patty.1 Thus, if expertise is an ingredient of regulatory
quality, the literature should lead us to expect a positive effect of independence on quality.
A somewhat more recent strand of literature focuses on the role of credible commitment
in regulation (e.g., Majone 1996; Levy and Spiller 1996; Gilardi 2002). The origins of the
link between independence, credible commitment and better policy-making lie in the field
of monetary policy, where it is common to argue that politicians use monetary policy to
boost the economy (i.e., increase employment and growth); that politicians’ actions in this
regard are rationally expected and anticipated by price- and wage-setters; and that as a result,
discretionary monetary policy leads only to above-target inflation rather than to the desired
gains in employment and output (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). To avoid inflationary bias, and
to deal with the time inconsistency in monetary policy, politicians may wish to tie their hands,
and delegate to an independent and more ‘conservative’ central bank (Rogoff, 1985).
Regulation scholars have argued that time inconsistency is important in their field, too. Politi-
cians wish to commit to long-term regulatory policies, but face incentives to deviate and pur-
sue politically attractive short-term policy options (Majone, 1996). For instance, while price
caps are regulatory instruments to correct market failure in monopolistic or oligopolistic sec-
tors, they may also be used by politicians for electoral purposes. Yet, anticipating such use of
caps, potential investors may stay or move away from these sectors, leading to markets being
hampered rather than corrected (cf. Levy and Spiller 1996). By delegating to IRAs headed
by officials with different time horizons and incentives, politicians can tie their hands and
commit credibly to long-term regulatory objectives and better decisions.
Summarizing the arguments, agency independence may sever the link between the politi-
cal preferences and policy decisions – a point we come back to in the next section – but it
enhances regulatory quality, whether we follow the logic of expertise or the logic of commit-
ment. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1. The higher the degree of formal political independence, the higher the quality of
regulatory decision-making.
1 That is, looking at the ‘revolving door’ literature, regulatory expertise seems rather transferable to the private
(regulated) sector (Moe 2012, 1171.)
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3 Accountability and regulatory quality
Political accountability plays a crucial role in normative discussions of IRAs. That is, if reg-
ulators are not accountable to anyone, their legitimacy is called into question (Majone 1999;
Scott 2000). Accountability does not feature prominently in empirical studies though. The
main reason is that many scholars equate it with control, which is itself considered to be
the inverse of independence. Hence, mechanisms designed to ensure accountability by defini-
tion compromise independence, and assessing both independence and accountability becomes
nonsensical.2 Yet, a closer look at the two concepts may lead us to treat them as separate di-
mensions.
Scholars working on accountability typically define the concept in terms of answerability, or
the ability to provide information on, and explanation of, one’s conduct.3 For Philp, for in-
stance, “A is accountable with respect to M when some individual, body or institution, Y,
can require A to inform and explain/justify his or her conduct with respect to M” (2009, 32;
cf. Scott 2000, 40). Analogous to our treatment of independence, we concentrate on formal
accountability to politicians, acknowledging all the while that the actual use of accountabil-
ity may not correspond to what provisions prescribe, and that other forms of accountability
(horizontal and downwards) may also matter. We say that an IRA is formally accountable to
politicians to the extent that politicians can require the agency to provide information on, and
explanation of, its conduct on the basis of statutory provisions rather than non-legal forms of
compulsion.
Defined in this way, the independence of IRAs is compatible with some degree of accountabil-
ity. That is, agencies may make their day-to-day decisions independently from politicians and
political preferences, but may still be required to provide information on, and explanation of,
these decisions ex post facto. Indeed, recent empirical research has shown that agencies can
be both independent and accountable – they can “have their cake and eat it, too” (Maggetti
2 Something like this belief is certainly implicit in a number of coding schemes used to operationalize political
independence, with reporting requirements being treated as inimical to independence (e.g., Gilardi 2002; Edwards
and Waverman 2006).
3 This understanding is also reflected in dictionary definitions. For instance, the Oxford English Dictionary
defines accountable as “required or expected to justify actions of decisions.” The possibility of sanctions is a
second component that is frequently included, but there is no agreement on this element. As Philp sets out,
sanctions may enable accountability to better achieve certain outcomes, but this may be a potential additional
feature rather than an attribute (2009, 35-36).
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et al., 2013).4 Thus, accountability and independence need to be operationalized carefully and
separately, and their effects disentangled.
Systematic empirical research on the impact of accountability on policy-making is rare. As
Dubnick and Frederickson (2011) put it, the literature has largely failed to go beyond ‘promises’
of what accountability can achieve. Yet, there are two literatures that explicitly link the two
concepts: the constitutionalist and the social-psychological literature.
For constitutionalist scholars, first of all, the role of accountability – and checks and balances
more generally – is one of preventing and detecting abuse and misuse of political power.
Constitutionalism is grounded in a considerable distrust of power-holders. As Loewenstein
put it: “A stigma is attached to power, and only the saints among the power holders – rarely
found – are able to resist the temptation of abusing it” (1957, 8). The solution to the problem
is believed to lie in institutional design, which would allow us to constrain and restrain the
exercise of political power.
These ideas have found expression in the Federalist Papers and the US Constitution, and they
are at the heart of constitutionalist principles such as limited government, checks and bal-
ances, separation of powers and judicial review. They are also reflected in the literature on
the role of accountability arrangements. That is, requirements to provide information and
justification are considered to help prevent and detect arbitrary exercise and abuse of public
authority, including the misuse of public funds, the pursuance of particular rather than gen-
eral interests, the unequal or unfair treatment of citizens (or companies), the neglect of rights
and freedoms, and corruption and patronage (e.g., Bovens, 2007). This is not only important
from a normative point of view, but it may also effect organizational performance. If political
power-holders such as regulatory agencies may be tempted to misuse and abuse their pub-
lic authority, if these activities are associated with worse performance, and if accountability
mechanisms may provide incentives not to engage in these activities, we shall expect higher
degrees of accountability to be associated with higher quality of (regulatory) decision-making.
The micro-foundations of the link between accountability and performance can be found in the
field of social psychology and, in particular, the work by Tetlock (see Patil et al., 2014). What
is stressed in this literature is the role of accountability as a generator of implicit or explicit
expectations “that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings and actions to others”
4 This is also how practitioners tend to think about the concepts. Looking at the websites of prominent regu-
lators and central banks, one finds statements about their independence as well as their accountability. Also, an
expert meetings on regulation organized by the OECD in January 2005 was titled “Designing Independent and
Accountable Regulatory Authorities for High Quality Regulation”.
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(Lerner and Tetlock, 1999, 255). These expectations play an important role in decision-making
as they lead actors to be less prone to the fundamental attribution error (Tetlock, 1985), and
to process information more carefully (Tetlock, 1983) and accurately (Mero and Motowidlo,
1995).
The link between accountability and the quality of decision-making has mainly been estab-
lished at the individual level. As our research focuses on organizations, we need to be careful
when formulating our expectations: organizational decision-making cannot be treated as a
simple aggregate of individual-level processes. Yet, there is at least some evidence suggesting
that the effect of accountability on the use of information operates at the individual as well as
the group level (Weldon and Gargano, 1988).
However, studies of accountability do not unequivocally point to a positive effect on perfor-
mance. Accountability is also associated with excessive costs and red tape. This is particularly
true for provisions that are generic in nature, including standardized and routine requirements
such as obligations to produce annual reports and evaluation protocols (Bovens and Schille-
mans, 2014). Indeed, scholars have emphasized how sensitive the design of accountability is,
and how important appropriate design is for accountability to have desirable effects on per-
formance (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007; May, 2007). Nonetheless, as accountability provisions
are mainly linked to better performance, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H2. The higher the degree of formal political accountability, the higher the quality of
regulatory decision-making.
Accountability may not only have a direct effect on the quality of regulatory decision-making,
but may also strengthen the effect of independence. For this argument to make sense, we need
to have a closer look at the differential effect of independence. As set out in Section 2, political
independence can increase the level of expertise in regulatory decision-making, and reduce
short-termism in the process. Yet, insulating regulatory agencies from politicians comes at a
cost: by granting higher degrees of political independence, one also enhances the possibility
of slack and bureaucratic drift (e.g., McCubbins et al. 1987; Bawn 1995; Gailmard and Patty
2007). That is, regulators may actually do something other than that which they were initially
directed to do by their political principals.
Partially, political independence is precisely intended to create the possibility for regulatory
agencies to drift. Following the logic of credible commitment, regulators shall stick to long-
term policy objectives even if their political principals want them to (temporarily) move away
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from these objectives. Hence, the potential decline in policy responsiveness to politicians’
preferences may constitute an asset rather than a cost. However, policy unresponsiveness
is not the only concern; bureaucratic drift may also take a more procedural form. Political
independence removes some checks and balances from the policy process as it reduces the
opportunities for politicians to keep an eye on the way in which agencies carry out their
work. Reduced oversight makes it, ceteris paribus, easier for regulators to exercise their power
arbitrarily and to misuse their funds. It may result in more corner-cutting, fewer procedural
checks, more superficial investigations of complaints, and lower levels of due process. In sum,
political independence raises concerns of a constitutionalist nature.
Ideally, regulators are designed in such a way that independence enhances levels of exper-
tise and long-termism, while opportunities for misuse and abuse of power are being curbed.
Such a design may be created by complementing political independence with provisions for
accountability (Majone, 1999; Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). If the two concepts are, indeed,
“complementary and mutually supporting” (Majone, 1999, 14), accountability can serve as a
guard against abuse and misuse, as regulators are called upon to explain and justify their
actions – or lack thereof (cf. Quintyn and Taylor, 2007, 35). Accordingly, we hypothesize that
the effect of independence will depend on the level of accountability, and more specifically:
H3. The higher the level of formal political accountability, the stronger the effect of
formal political independence on the regulatory quality of agencies
4 Data and operationalization
Having hypothesized the relationship between independence, accountability and the qual-
ity of regulatory decision-making, we now turn to the operationalization of these and other
variables.
Independence and accountability
Our measures of formal political independence and accountability are based on the analysis
of the statutory provisions governing independent competition authorities in the 30 OECD
countries included in our analysis. As we are interested in the variation in the design of
independent regulatory agencies, we excluded from our analysis those competition authorities
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that were part of a ministerial hierarchy in any given year.5 Thus, the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice was excluded, as were the Belgian Directorate General for
Competition (operating until 2013), Spain’s Competition Service (operating until 2007), and
the non-independent Dutch Competition Authority (operating until 2005).
Over the period in question (2005-2014), we observed considerable within-country (and within-
agency) variation in design. Incorporating this variation in the analysis is important as it al-
lows for more controlled comparison than does the cross-country variation. We therefore dis-
aggregated competition authorities, and considered competition authorities which had been
reformed, or which have been subjected to alterations in their independence or accountability,
as separate bodies. Thus, although we have data for thirty countries, we have information for
46 regulators, or regulator-spells.6
For each authority, we recorded information regarding different items relating to their statu-
tory design. The selection of the formal political independence items was based on previous
literature, particularly the work by Gilardi (2002). For each item, we coded the agency’s ‘re-
sponse’, or the category that best described the statutory provisions imposed upon the agency.
For some items – for example, provisions which are either present or absent, and which are
commonly found in statutes governing competition authorities – the coding was relatively
straightforward. For other items, though, the coding was more difficult, either because the
provision found in the statute was not immediately reconcilable with the list of options, or
because the relevant provision was a matter of administrative law more generally. The coding
was carried out by one of the authors and a research assistant; differences in coding were
discussed by the authors and reconciled by mutual agreement.
To assess the scalability of the items, and to turn our ordinal measurements on several items
into a single measure, we used a latent trait model based on item response theory (IRT) (cf.
Hanretty and Koop, 2012; Selin, 2015). IRT models treat the observed item responses as a
function of an unobserved latent variable – in our case, the trait we refer to as independence.
They allow for the estimation of the weights of items, and the scores of item responses, on
the latent trait, and for the exclusion of those items for which reasonable weights and scores
5 One could, in principle, compare independent and non-independent competition authorities. However, it
would be inappropriate to give non-independent authorities (or ministerial divisions) the value of zero on the
independence index as being a non-independent authority is not the same as being an independent authority
with the lowest value on the index. The alternative is to compare the two categories of organizations, but this
is problematic because there are only a few non-independent competition authorities for which we have data on
quality.
6 Only one country – the UK – had two independent competition authorities (the Competition Commission
and the Office of Fair Trading), and only in the period before 2014. We included both.
11
cannot be estimated. IRT models are similar to confirmatory factor analysis in the sense
that both attempt to identify an underlying latent factor. Yet, while factor analysis requires
the inclusion of continuous data, IRT models do not have such a requirement (Raju et al.,
2002, 520). This makes IRT models more appropriate for our data structure, which includes
items that are measured categorically and even dichotomously. Our aggregate measure of
independence is the measures that best ‘explains’ the observed pattern of responses, given a
set of assumptions.
Formally speaking,7 suppose we have information for J regulators on I = 1, ..., I items, each
of which has K categories. These items may ‘discriminate’ between regulators to a greater or
lesser extent. Use βi to stand for the discrimination parameter, and interpret it as analogous
to a factor loading in a conventional factor analysis (see ‘discrimination’ in Tables 1 and 2). In
this way, an item with an associated value of β equal to 10 ‘matters more’ for independence
than an item with a β value of 1. Within each item, the individual response categories may
be ‘easier’ or ‘more difficult’ to achieve, depending on the regulator’s level of independence.
Use αik to refer to the location of each item response category, such that response categories
with higher values of alpha require ‘more’ of the latent trait (see ‘location’ in Tables 1 and 2).
If we use θj to stand for the level of the latent trait, then we can model the manifest responses
as follows:
logit(γik) = βi(θj − α∗ik),
where γik is the cumulative probability of a response in the kth category or higher to the ith
item. Thus, although the left-hand side of the equation features the manifest responses of each
regulator, the interest lies in the parameter on the right hand side, namely θj, the measure of
the formal independence of each competition authority. Whether or not a regulator manages
to attain a particular category within an item depends on the gap between its latent level of
independence (θ) and the difficulty of the item category (α), as well as the discrimination pa-
rameter (high independence regulators might not demonstrate a high-independence response
if the discrimination of that item is low).
Our final measure of independence includes all items originally used by Gilardi (2002), with
three exceptions. First, we excluded items that are conceptually linked to the accountability
and powers of agencies rather than to independence. These are also items which previous
7 This section describes Samejima’s graded response model (Samejima, 1970), though note that we reverse the
symbols used to describe the location and discrimination parameters.
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research on IRAs demonstrated to be unrelated to the latent trait (see Hanretty and Koop,
2012). Second, we excluded items which turned out to be unrelated to the trait of formal
independence, thus excluding provisions on the identity of appointing actors. Our findings
in this respect are largely in line with those in previous work on a larger sample of indepen-
dent regulatory agencies (Hanretty and Koop, 2012). Third, we excluded items which lacked
variation in our specific sample of competition authorities. We were left with eighteen items
in total. These items, the response categories and the latent trait data are shown in Table 1.8
Table 1: Independence items
Item Categories Location Discrimination
What type of position does the agency
head have?
Permanent position 1.1
Fixed-term position − 3.9 1.1
What is the tenure of the head of the
agency?
4 years or fewer 0.2
5 years − 1.0 0.2
6 years 0.1 0.2
More than 6 years 1.2 0.2
Do the founding documents give provi-
sions relating to the dismissal of the head?
No, there are no such provi-
sions
225.5
Yes, there are such provi-
sions
−658.6 225.5
Under what conditions may the head be
dismissed?
Head may be dismissed for
any reason
0.9
Head may be dismissed
only for non-political rea-
sons (illness, incapacity)
− 2.4 0.9
Head may not be dismissed − 1.0 0.9
Do the founding documents give provi-
sions relating to the incompatibility of the
head?
No, there are no such provi-
sions
0.9
Yes, there are such provi-
sions
− 3.3 0.9
May the appointment of the head be re-
newed?
Yes, the appointment may
be renewed indefinitely
Yes, the appointment may
be renewed once only
No, the appointment may
not be renewed
Is there a formal statement of the indepen-
dence of the agency head?
No 0.1
Yes 0.4 0.1
What is the tenure of board members? 4 years or fewer 1.3
5 years 0.3 1.3
6 years 1.4 1.3
More than 6 years 2.5 1.3
Under what conditions may board mem-
bers be dismissed?
Members may be dismissed
for any reason
0.6
8 The list includes an item on politicians being able to overturn the decisions of the competition authority,
which some jurisdictions allow for. Importantly, it is the judiciary that is the main branch when it comes to
vetoing decisions. However, not only does the latter capture independence from the judiciary rather than from
politics, it is also a feature on which no variation exists. That is, in all countries, affected parties can turn to the
judiciary to appeal the competition authority’s decisions.
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Table 1: (continued)
Item Categories Location Discrimination
Members may be dismissed
only for non-political rea-
sons (illness, incapacity)
− 1.8 0.6
Members may not be dis-
missed
0.6
Do the founding documents give provi-
sions relating to the incompatibility of
board members?
No, there are no such provi-
sions
Yes, there are such provi-
sions
May the appointment of board members
be renewed?
Yes, the appointment may
be renewed indefinitely
Yes, the appointment may
be renewed once only
No, the appointment may
not be renewed
Is there a formal statement of the indepen-
dence of board members?
No 0.9
Yes 1.5 0.9
Is there a formal statement of the agency’s
independence?
No 0.3
Yes − 1.4 0.3
May the agency’s decisions be overturned
by a politician?
Yes
Only in exceptional cases
No
What is the source of the agency’s budget? Only fees/levies from the
industry
0.7
Both fees/levies and gov-
ernment funding
2.0 0.7
Only or primarily govern-
ment funding
3.3 0.7
How is the budget controlled? By the agency itself (this is
pretty much always the case;
also if (2) or (3)
0.0
By an audit office, accoun-
tant and/or court
− 1.0 0.0
By the government and/or
parliament/parliamentary
committee (and typically
also still (2) in that case)
0.0
Which body decides on the agency’s inter-
nal organisation
By the agency alone 0.0
By the agency and the gov-
ernment
− 0.8 0.0
By the government alone 0.6 0.0
Which body decides on the agency’s per-
sonnel policy?
By the agency alone
By the agency and the gov-
ernment
By the government alone
We followed the same procedure to create an aggregate measure of formal political account-
ability. Again, the selection of these items was based on previous literature. Specifically, we
followed Koop (2011), except that we excluded items which lacked variation in our sample
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of competition authorities. The remaining items relating to accountability, and the different
responses to these items, are shown in Table 2. We were left with eleven items in total.
Table 2: Accountability items
Item Categories Location Discrimination
Is the agency required to send information
upon request to government?
No 0.8
Yes −1.3 0.8
Is the agency required to send information
upon request to parliament?
No 0.6
Yes 0.5 0.6
Is the agency required to submit an annual
plan to government?
No 0.7
Yes 1.0 0.7
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
2.4 0.7
Is the agency required to submit an annual
or multi-annual plan to parliament?
No 0.6
Yes 0.9 0.6
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
2.3 0.6
Is the agency required to submit an annual
itemised budget to government?
No 0.4
Yes 0.1 0.4
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
1.5 0.4
Is the agency required to submit an annual
itemised budget to parliament?
No 0.7
Yes 1.0 0.7
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
2.4 0.7
Is the agency required to submit an annual
activity report to government?
No 0.3
Yes −1.2 0.3
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
0.2 0.3
Is the agency required to submit an annual
activity report to parliament?
No 0.2
Yes −0.8 0.2
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
0.6 0.2
Is the agency required to submit an annual
financial report to government?
No 0.7
Yes −0.6 0.7
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
0.8 0.7
Is the agency required to submit an annual
financial report to parliament?
No 0.7
Yes 0.0 0.7
Yes, and it also needs ap-
proval
1.4 0.7
Can parliament hear the head of the
agency?
No 0.5
Yes −1.0 0.5
The aggregate measures are shown in Table 3, which lists all authorities in alphabetical order.
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The table also shows the limited association between the formal independence of authorities
and their formal accountability towards politicians: the Pearson correlation coefficient be-
tween the two variables measured the agency level is only r = -0.16, which is not significant at
standard levels (d.f. = 29, p = 0.39).
Table 3: Independence, accountability and ratings of agencies over time
Country (Period) Rating Independence Accountability
AUS (2004–2010) l4 l 4 1.41 0.91
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
AUS (2011–2014) l4 l 4 1.41 0.91
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
AUT (2004–2014) l3 l 3 -1.38 -0.79
Federal Competition Authority
BEL (2004–2005) l2.5 l 3 0.81 -1.29
Competition Council
BEL (2006–2012) l2.5 l 2.5 0.81 -1.29
Competition Council
BEL (2013–2014) l2.5 l 2.5 0.91 -0.33
Belgian Competition Authority
CAN (2004–2014) l4 l 3.5 -1.43 -0.93
Competition Bureau
CHE (2004–2014) l3 l 3 0.7 -1.67
Competition Commission
CHL (2008–2014) l2 l 3 -1.51 -0.21
National Economic Prosecutor’s Office
CZE (2006–2014) l3 l 2.5 -1.39 0.65
Office for the Protection of Competition
DEU (2004–2014) l4
l 5
-1.44 -0.99
Federal Cartel Office
DNK (2004–2014) l4 l 2.5 -1.43 -0.52
Competition and Consumer Authority
ESP (2008–2012) l3.5 l 4 0.89 1.38
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National Competition Commission
ESP (2013–2014) l4 l 4 1.56 1.38
National Markets and Competition Commission
FIN (2004–2012) l3.5 l 3 -1.45 0.55
Competition Authority
FIN (2013–2014) l3 l 3 -1.38 0.55
Competition and Consumer Authority
FRA (2004–2008) l4 l 4 -0.06 -1.29
Competition Council
FRA (2009–2014) l4
l 5
-0.09 -1.29
Competition Authority
GBR (2004–2013)
l4.5 l 4.5
-0.25 -0.23
Competition Commission
GBR (2004–2013) l4 l 4 -0.39 0.03
Office of Fair Trading
GBR (2014–2014) l 4 -0.39 0.03
Competition and Markets Authority
GRC (2004–2011) l2 l 2.5 0.08 0.12
Competition Commission
GRC (2012–2014) l3 l 3.5 1.25 0.22
Competition Commission
HUN (2006–2014) l3 l 3 0.52 -0.61
Competition Authority
IRL (2004–2013) l4 l 3 -0.29 0.53
Competition Authority
IRL (2014–2014) l 2.5 -0.29 0.66
Competition and Consumer Protection Commission
ISR (2004–2011) l3 l 3 -1.39 -1.8
Antitrust Authority
ISR (2012–2014) l3 l 3 -1.39 -1.8
Antitrust Authority
ITA (2004–2014) l4 l 3.5 1.66 -0.23
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Authority for Competition and the Market
JPN (2004–2014) l3
l 4.5
1.31 -1.4
Fair Trade Commission
KOR (2004–2014) l3.5
l 4.5
0.02 -1.8
Fair Trade Commission
MEX (2004–2012) l3 l 2.5 1.47 0.83
Federal Competition Commission
MEX (2013–2014) l3 l 3 2.17 1.23
Federal Economic Competition Commission
NLD (2005–2012) l4 l 4 -0.1 -0.8
Netherlands Competition Authority
NLD (2013–2014) l3.5 l 3.5 0.38 -0.21
Authority for Consumers and Markets
NOR (2004–2014) l3 l 3.5 -1.44 -0.55
Competition Authority
NZL (2004–2014) l3.5 l 3 -0.09 1
Commerce Commission
POL (2004–2006) l3 l 3 -1.56 0.1
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
POL (2007–2014) l2.5 l 3 -3.52 0.1
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection
PRT (2004–2013) l3 l 3 0.91 1.19
Competition Authority
PRT (2014–2014) l 3 1.73 1.39
Competition Authority
SVK (2006–2011) l2.5 l 2 -1.39 1.2
Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic
SWE (2004–2008) l3.5 l 3 -1.42 -0.55
Competition Authority
SWE (2009–2014) l3 l 3 -1.42 -0.55
Competition Authority
TUR (2011–2014) l2.5 l 3 1.48 -0.2
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Competition Authority
USA (2004–2014)
l4.5 l 5
1.52 0.56
Federal Trade Commission
Regulatory quality
There is a broad literature on ‘regulatory quality’. This is due in part to the multidimension-
ality of the concept. Indeed, ‘high-quality’ regulatory work refers to work that is efficient,
proportionate, legitimate, consistent, not unduly prescriptive, and enforceable. Yet, even if we
agree on the characteristics, the measurement of quality, or of its constituent characteristics,
remains difficult. Researchers have generally accepted overall measures of regulatory quality
at the country level, as is seen from the widespread use of World Bank Governance indica-
tors (Kaufmann et al., 2010). It is both possible and desirable to seek out measures that are
finer-grained both in terms of their level of application (organizational rather than country
level), and in terms of the facets of quality they examine. Though the GCR’s comprehensive
proxy measure of the quality of competition policy enforcement has, as we will point out, its
weaknesses, it comes closest to what we consider desirable.
Three approaches to quality in regulation can be identified in the literature: those focusing
on process, activity and real-world outcomes (Radaelli, 2004). Process-based approaches conceive
of regulatory quality as a characteristic of the work of regulators such that the procedures,
investigations, analyses, and intermediate outputs are of good quality, judged according to
standards internal to the kind of work. Thus, high-quality work may refer to well-targeted
investigations, clear and well-informed legal analyses, and state-of-the-art econometric anal-
yses. Activity-based approaches, on the other hand, understand quality as a characteristic of
regulatory work such that regulators doing more work (e.g, more cartel investigations, more
sectoral inquiries) are of better quality. Finally, outcome-based approaches take quality to
mean regulatory work that promotes those outcomes that regulators are meant to promote.
Outcome-based approaches have so far be most common. Yet, as set out in Section 1, outcomes
are affected by many other variables for which it is hard to control. Activity-based approaches
also have their problems: in the case of competition authorities, high levels of activity may
either imply that the agency is doing a good job – i.e., it manages to detect non-competitive
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behavior – or that it is failing to do its job well – i.e., it has not managed to create competitive
markets. Moreover, to the extent that certain activities are included in targets, levels of activity
may be affected by gaming, with other, non-measured activities being neglected. For those
reasons, we rely on a measure which is primarily process-based. We concentrate on high
quality processes, as opposed to high levels of activity or high-quality outcomes (though it
would be surprising if high quality processes persistently failed to deliver good outcomes).
Whereas our measures of independence and accountability are based on collected data, our
measure of the quality is based on what might be termed ‘found data’. The GCR has, since
2000, published an annual report called Rating Enforcement. This rates the work of competi-
tion agencies from across the world in the past year. The first edition rated 16 agencies in
13 countries, with the United States being the only non-European country. The 2015 edition
which we use rates 36 agencies from 34 countries, including IRAs from Asia and Latin Amer-
ica (Global Competition Review, 2015). We use these ratings as the basis for our analysis,
excluding countries from non-OECD countries.9
The ratings published by the GCR are produced by combining the results of an expert survey
with quantitative data and qualitative judgements made by the GCR editorial team. The
methods used to produce these ratings have changed over time. Since 2005, ratings have been
ascribed to individual agencies rather than to competition regimes, which had happened in
the years before. We therefore use the ratings for the years 2005 to 2014. Experts are invited
to give an aggregate star rating to agencies with which they are familiar (thus permitting –
and indeed encouraging – experts to judge agencies from different countries), and are then
invited to give open-ended responses to questions on the regulator(s).
GCR describes the expert survey as a “user’s survey”, defining a user of a competition au-
thority as anyone with “cause to liaise with a competition agency on a proceeding whether
as a private practitioner, an in-house counsel, business executive, consumer representative, or
as an economist”, though it notes that the majority of respondents tend to be lawyers and
economists (Global Competition Review, 2005, 2). The list of respondents was constructed us-
ing trade publications, including but not limited to The International Who’s Who of Competition
Lawyers, The International Who’s Who of Competition Economists, 40 under 40, Women in Antitrust,
9 The reason is that the factors promoting quality in established democracies may be rather different from those
in developing democracies.
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and The Who’s Who of Public Affairs. Subscribers to the service were also given the possibility
to fill out the survey. For identified experts, the response rate was approximately one in seven
(Global Competition Review, 2006, 2). The eventual ratings depend on the results of this ex-
pert survey, and on the opinion of GCR staff, who conduct in-depth interviews and analyses
of statistical data on budgets, case loads, staffing, and the reporting in the Global Competition
Review itself. These opinions are included to introduce ‘flexibility’, and to make ratings more
comparable across countries (Global Competition Review, 2011, 11).
Though we do not know exactly what it is about the enforcement of competition policy that
discriminates between the different ratings, the GCR does provide insight into this question,
and this information leads us to conclude that the notion of quality captured by the GCR
is related to a process-based understanding of quality, rather than a real-world outcomes or
activity-based approach. First, the ratings aim to capture the performance of the agencies
and specifically disavows consideration of outcomes in terms of the success of competition
policy or the performance of economy (Global Competition Review, 2008). Second, the ratings
primarily incorporate assessments of the overall quality of the process of enforcement rather
than the output. Consequently, competition authorities that only take decisions on cases that
are brought before them by another authority — tribunal-like bodies such as the Canadian
Competition Tribunal and the Finnish Market Court — are excluded. The latter are considered
‘passive’ authorities, while the GCR is interested in the ‘active’ part of enforcement — the
monitoring and the investigations. Although the GCR emphasizes that it collects “a great deal
of data on agency activity”, including data on merger, cartel and abuse of dominance activity
and policy and advocacy work (Global Competition Review, 2005, 2), these statistics are only
ever read in conjunction with the questions in the surveys which ask users to evaluate, for
each agency they are familiar with, its areas of excellence, the area that could improve, the
margin of improvement over the past five years, markets which the agency does and does
not understand, the suitability of the agency head to the agency’s needs, and the agency’s
morale. While we can never be sure about the motivation of users when they rated competition
authorities – which is a more general problem of (inter-)subjective measures–, the fact that
they were asked to reflect on these specific issues makes it at least more likely that they rated
quality rather than other features which they were (dis)satisfied with.
The GCR also sets out what type of factors contribute to higher ratings (Global Competition
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Review, 2005, 2007). Features that play such a role are (a) vigorously pursuing in all areas the
agency is responsible for, including politically sensitive areas such as domestic cartels, abuse
of dominance – particularly by former state-owned companies – and government-sponsored
distortions of competition, (b) not overusing informal settlement processes, as “[w]here the
law is ‘grey’, at a certain point agencies have to make an effort to clarify it” (Global Com-
petition Review, 2005, 4), (c) being a real enforcer rather than investing mainly in advocacy
work, market studies and ‘trial by media’, with courtroom victories being an important indi-
cator (Global Competition Review, 2012, 2014), (d) demonstrating leadership in competition
policy by means of research and development work and participation in debates on where
the lines between pro- and anti-competitive behaviour lie, (e) being a learning organisation,
using state of the art methodologies and engaging in continuous self-assessment, (f) taking
an economic approach rather than a too formalistic one with an emphasis on the per se rule
of anti-competitive behavior, and (g) demonstrating leadership in international co-operation.
Hence, this is a rich understanding of quality in terms of process which incorporates substan-
tial elements of phronesis, or practical judgement.
Because this is ‘found data’, and provided on a commercial basis, we cannot calculate mea-
sures of inter-expert reliability. However, GCR states that their star ratings demonstrate con-
vergent validity, in that agencies with higher star-ratings were also more likely to be cited by
the agencies themselves as ‘most admired’ in a special 2006 survey question (Global Competi-
tion Review, 2006, 2). Additionally, the ratings – which are awarded on a scale of one to five,
with half-stars permitted (and even quarter stars between 2005 and 2006) – demonstrate a
form of test-retest reliability: the average Spearman between agency ratings in adjacent years
is high, at 0.958.10 Finally, the measures correlate reasonably well with two relevant outcome
measures from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report (Schwab
and Sala-i Marin, 2015). The first measure asks survey respondents to rate the “effectiveness
of anti-monopoly policy” on a 1-7 scale; the Spearman correlation between GCR rankings and
WEF survey responses is moderate (r = 0.38). The second measure asks survey respondents
to rate the “Extent of market dominance” on a 1-7 scale, reversed so that higher scores indicate
lower market dominance. Again, the Spearman correlation between GCR rankings and WEF
survey responses is moderate (r = 0.41). We use the GCR rankings rather than the WEF mea-
10 Note that although we permit quarter-stars in this part of the analysis, for technical reasons relating to the
convergence of a probit model estimated with multiple thresholds, we round quarter-marks up to the nearest
half-mark in the analysis that follows.
22
sures because we prefer, for the reasons stated above, using a process measure and because
the GCR measures are based on individuals (lawyers and economists) who may work for both
the regulator and the regulatees; the WEF measures, by contrast, are based exclusively on
business executives, who may have a preference for more lenient competition policy.
Control variables
Based on theoretical considerations and the findings of previous studies, we include six control
variables: size, specialization, experience, agency powers, government effectiveness, and EU
membership.
First, we include in our models the log of the number of staff working on competition policy
within the agency. This is not equal to the number of staff working within the agency, because
some staff may work on non-competition related tasks, such as consumer affairs or other ar-
eas of regulation if the agency is a multi-sectoral regulator. We include this control because
agencies that are in some sense bigger may produce better work because they can afford to
specialize in different sectors of the economy or in different types of analysis. We take the log
of this number because we expect the effects of specialization to show a decreasing marginal
rate of return. Information on this variable comes from successive editions of the Global Com-
petition Review. Missing values for a particular agency-year observation were carried forward
(backwards) from the last (next) agency-year with non-missing information.
Second, as a more targeted measure of specialization, we include in our models the propor-
tion of staff within the agency who work on competition issues (rather than on, for example,
consumer protection or sectoral regulation). We include this control variable because formal
modelling suggests that specialization can bolster independence (Dewatripont et al., 1999).
Information on this variable comes from successive editions of the Global Competition Review.
Third, we include the log of (one plus) the number of years since the establishment of a competi-
tion authority organizationally separate from a government ministry. We include this control
because we believe that agencies with more experience perform better – or that agencies which
have no previous experience of competition policy to draw upon face teething difficulties in
their early years. We use information from Jordana et al. (2011) to identify the year of estab-
lishment of the first organizationally-separate competition authority.
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Fourth, we include a measure of the agency’s powers. We take into consideration what can
be seen as the ‘basic powers’ of IRAs, with variation across agencies still present. These
powers are: (1) the initiation of investigations, (2) the imposition of administrative fines, (3)
the introduction of generally-binding rules (delegated or secondary legislation), and (4) the
establishment of rules of procedure. The measure is similar in spirit to our measures of
independence and accountability, the aggregation being based on an analysis of the responses
to the four items. The items loadings are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Powers items
Item Categories Location Discrimination
Can the agency establish its own rules of
procedure?
No 3.3
Yes, and no approval needed −3.9 3.3
Yes, and approval needed −2.5 3.3
Can the agency introduce general binding
rules?
No 1.2
Yes 1.3 1.2
Can the agency initiate investigations? No 0.7
Yes −4.2 0.7
Can the agency impose (administrative)
fines on companies?
No 0.2
Yes −1.3 0.2
Fifth, we include in our models a measure of government effectiveness in each country. We
use this measure as a proxy for bureaucratic capacity or “the ability to accomplish intended
actions” (Huber and McCarty, 2004, 481). Bureaucratic capacity may be low for a variety
of reasons, including the lack of personal capacity of staff, the breakdown and instability of
organizational structures, and the presence of incentives for corruption (idem). Importantly,
as Huber and McCarty (2004) point out, reductions in capacity not only reduce the general
quality of policy-making via straightforward efficiency loss, but also diminish the incentives
of civil servants to comply with legislation. Both are relevant for our outcome of interest – the
quality of regulatory decision-making. Bureaucratic capacity is a feature of the system as a
whole, but it is hypothesized to affect all parts of the bureaucracy, including the competition
authority. Hence, we may say that competition authorities ‘inherit’ a base level of capacity
from the rest of the bureaucratic system. To construct the measure, we use data from the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Specifically, we use
information concerning the government effectiveness component, which captures
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“perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formula-
tion and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to
such policies” (2010, 4).
The World Bank’s measure is based on fifteen separate sources. We are confident that we
can use a measure of the effectiveness of public services to explain the quality of a particular
public service, because none of the sources specifically ask about competition policy, and those
sources which do ask about effectiveness in specific areas ask about policy areas which are
very different to competition policy, such as education, healthcare, transportation and utilities.
Missing values for a particular agency-year observation were carried forward (backwards)
from the last (next) agency-year with non-missing information.
Sixth, and finally, we include a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the agency
operates in an EU member state. We include this variable because EU member states are ex-
posed to a form of horizontal accountability through their relationship with DG Competition.
Also, they benefit from exchange of best practice through their membership in the European
Competition Network (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2014). We expect this to lead to better perfor-
mance of competition authorities working in EU member states.
5 Analysis
In the previous section, we discussed the ratings provided by the GCR. We consider the overall
rankings ordinal rather than interval data, such that although four stars is better than three
stars, the difference between four and three stars may or may not be the same as the difference
between three and two stars. We therefore use a ordinal probit regression model.
In our case, our observations – regulator years – are not independent of one another. Rather,
we consider observations as nested within countries, and include random intercepts for each
country to model this. Although the observations are ordered, we do not explicitly model
the dynamics of these ratings.11 We do, however, include year fixed effects in some models
11 We do not expect regulatory quality to automatically carry over from year to year over and above the effects
of the relevant independent variables. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we have estimated a model with an
autoregressive parameter, which approximates the use of a lagged dependent variable in the ordinal case. The
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to allow for the possibility that the GCR became harsher or more lenient in different years.
Formally, we posit an underlying latent level of quality, y∗, which depends on our predictor
variables X and coefficients β, and random effects for countries c = 1 ... C:
y∗i = xiβ+ ηc + ei
e ∼ N(0, σ2)
ηc ∼ N(0, σ2η)
The latent level of quality is related to the observed rating j (j = 0...J) through a series of
thresholds:
yi = 0⇔ y∗i < τ1
yi = j⇔ τj < y∗i ≤ τj+1
yi = J ⇔ y∗i > τJ
The model is identified by setting σ2 to one, and by omitting an intercept (Jackman, 2009), and
is estimated using the ordinal package for R.
Table 5 shows the results of six different models. Models 1 and 2 show just the effects of
independence and accountability, net of any controls. Models 3 and 4 include our control
variables. Finally, models 5 and 6 include an interaction between independence and account-
ability. Models 2, 4 and 6 are different from models 1, 3 and 5 in that they include year fixed
effects (not shown). These year fixed effects are included to allow for the possibility that the
GCR might have become more or less generous with its ratings over time. The values of
the coefficients represent the change in the latent level of quality associated with a one-unit
increase in the relevant independent variable.
Before discussing the effects of particular variables, we will look at the fit of the different
models. The fit of models with year fixed effects is better, but not significantly so: a log-
likelihood ratio test shows that Model 4 does not fit significantly better than Model 3 (7.16 on
results – which we report in Table A1 in the Online Appendix – are similar to the ones presented in Table 5. The
effect of independence is positive and significant and the effect of accountability is negative, though the latter is
not significant in the autoregressive model.
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Table 5: Regression model results
Dependent variable:
GCR Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independence 0.968∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗ 0.687∗∗ 0.726∗∗ 0.658∗∗
(0.258) (0.260) (0.235) (0.241) (0.226) (0.230)
Accountability −0.725 −0.823∗ −0.696∗ −0.760∗ −0.749∗ −0.790∗
(0.399) (0.415) (0.336) (0.340) (0.331) (0.332)
log(No. staff) 0.840∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗ 0.989∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.283) (0.254) (0.280)
Proportion competition staff 0.344 0.206 0.338 0.186
(0.499) (0.511) (0.499) (0.511)
log(Experience in years) −0.084 −0.210 −0.089 −0.170
(0.322) (0.401) (0.319) (0.396)
Powers 0.984∗∗∗ 1.016∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255)
Govt effectiveness 2.033∗∗∗ 2.027∗∗∗ 1.954∗∗∗ 1.937∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.504) (0.465) (0.495)
EU member-state 1.340 1.354 1.416∗ 1.448∗
(0.707) (0.715) (0.684) (0.689)
Independence × accountability 0.392 0.349
(0.257) (0.254)
Year fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 315 315 315 315 315 315
Log Likelihood −341.493 −338.119 −323.873 −320.089 −322.736 −319.180
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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10 d.f., p = 0.71), and Model 6 does not fit significantly better than Model 5 (6.57 on 10 d.f.,
p = 0.77). There is therefore no evidence of grade inflation (or deflation) over the years.
The fit of the models with an interaction term is also not significantly better than the fit of
models without an interaction term. For the models without year fixed effects, Model 5 does
not fit significantly better than Model 3 (2.55 on 1 d.f., p = 0.11). Thus, although the coefficient
has the expected sign, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 3 (that the effects of independence are
greater given higher levels of accountability).
We now turn to the interpretation of the findings. In short, the effects of independence are
positive and highly significant. However, contrary to expectations, a more extensive set of
accountability provisions is associated with lower rather than higher quality of work, though
the effect is not always significant. Concerning other agency features, we find a highly signif-
icant effect of size: bigger agencies are better-rated. The same is true of agencies with powers
to do more things. Interestingly, we find no effect of experience, nor do we find any bene-
fit to specialization, contra Dewatripont et al. (1999). Concerning country characteristics, we
find a highly significant effect of general government effectiveness, and a positive effect of EU
membership.
Let us now have a closer look at the findings. Hypothesis 1, concerning formal political
independence, is confirmed: higher levels of formal political independence are associated with
higher quality of work.12 Although our quantitative analysis does not allow us to explore the
causal mechanism empirically, we expect the effect to work via the increase in expertise that
associated with higher levels of independence, via the increase in consistency associated with
the variable, or via both intervening variables. Importantly, our findings suggest that there
are good reasons to justify political independence by reference to better work.
The findings on political accountability raise more complicated questions. Hypothesis 2,
which referred to a positive effect of accountability on quality of work, is not confirmed.
If anything, there is an effect in the opposite direction, though it is not significant in all model
specifications.13 That is, increases in the type of accountability that we found in the design
12 The results are largely the same when we use ‘raw’ measures of independence (Table A2 in the Online
Appendix), except in the models which include the interaction term; in these two models, the effect is neither
significant nor positive.
13 The effect of accountability is negative and significant in Models 2-5 in Table 5. Yet, when we use ‘raw’
measures of independence and accountability (Table A2 in the Online Appendix), accountability ceases to be a
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of competition authorities are not associated with higher quality of work. The question is
whether this is a more general problem of accountability or a problem specific to the provi-
sions we found in the statutes of the agencies. On the one hand, as we pointed out in Section
3, accountability provisions introduce reporting procedures which add to the workload of
agencies. Indeed, the literature has linked accountability to red tape and excessive costs. On
the other hand, previous studies have associated the negative effects with a specific category
of provisions: provisions that are generic in nature, including requirements to produce annual
plans and reports (Bovens and Schillemans, 2014). These are exactly the kind of provisions
that we found in the design of competition authorities. Moreover, we only look at one type
of relationship when it comes to accountability: the accountability of competition authorities
to politicians. The negative effect of accountability may be relevant only for provisions for
political accountability. Even if such provisions come into effect after regulatory decisions
are taken – thus differing from political independence –, agencies may anticipate the prefer-
ences of their political account-holders, leading to the reintroduction of politics via the back
door. This is, for instance, why Majone (1999) advocates accountability to other actors than
politicians. It might also account for the absence of an interaction effect of independence and
accountability. All in all, we need to be careful when it comes to the interpretation of the
accountability findings: there are reasons to believe they may be specific to the generic and
political accountability that we looked at.14
The role of EU membership also deserve some more reflection. We included EU membership
because previous studies referred to the relevance of authorities’ co-ordination with the DG
Competition and other competition authorities in the context of the European Competition
Network. Such co-ordination is primarily aimed at ensuring that cases are allocated among
national competition authorities, and that case-relevant information is being exchanged. This
became crucial after the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, which increased the scope of the
responsibilities of national competition authorities to also include trade between EU member
states; not only trade within their own member state. Yet, while the different actors, including
significant predictor. Similarly, when we use the ratio of staff to the size of the economy (Table A3), accountability
ceases to be significant at the five percent level.
14 In addition, one may argue that accountability provisions may be a response to regulatory quality. That is,
governments may increase the accountability of agencies when faced with poor performance. To the extent that
there is such a response to performance, we expect it to take an informal form rather than the form of formal
provisions. Nonetheless, we have estimated a set of models which explore the potential of such reversed causality
(Tables A4-A9 in the Online Appendix). In none of the models is there a significant effect of the quality ratings
on accountability, suggesting that there is no convincing evidence that reverse causality can explain the negative
association we find, in most models, between accountability and regulatory quality.
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Figure 1: Effect of specified changes on GCR rating
Change (red dot = mean first difference;
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the DG Competition, do not have any formal power over one another, the co-ordination has
resulted in an increase in horizontal accountability, learning from best practices, and even
adoption of ‘soft law’ (Maggetti and Gilardi, 2014). Hence, supranational co-ordination has
had an effect of national policy-making (ibid). Although our analysis cannot tell us what the
causal mechanism is exactly, it suggests that the co-ordination has not only affected the type
of policies introduced at the national level, but also the quality of regulatory decision-making,
which has improved.
Because the coefficients in Table 5 represent shifts on a latent scale, and because the latent
scale is hardly intuitive, the substantive importance of the coefficients can be put into context
by considering their effect on the ratings awarded by the GCR. Here we consider the effects
shown in our preferred model, Model 3.15
Figure 1 shows the effect of specified changes on the probability of receiving a ranking of four
stars or more, when all other variables which might affect rankings are held at their mean.16
When all variables are set to their mean, the probability of receiving a four-star ranking or
better is relatively low, at 20%.
When we move independence from the mean to the top quintile, the probability of a four-
15 We prefer Model 3 because it is the best-performing model according to the Akaike Information Criterion
(and thus explains the observed data both well and relatively parsimoniously). The effects under different models
would be similar, even for coefficients which are not significant at the 5% level.
16 These first differences are calculated by sampling from the joint distribution of the coefficients, but taking the
threshold parameters as fixed.
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star ranking doubles, to just over 40%. The distribution of first differences is skewed, and
in many simulations the effect of an increase in independence is much greater. When we
make a comparable change to accountability, by moving it to the top quintile, the probability
of a four-star ranking decreases, to 11.6%. The magnitude of this change is smaller, despite
the larger coefficient. This is because the changes in independence move the agency towards
the steepest part of the curve of the probit function, pushing the agency over the four-star
threshold, whereas changes in accountability move the agency away from this threshold, and
make a low-probability event less likely. The effects of a change in powers are more similar to
the effects of a change in independence.
Somewhat surprisingly, the effects of these design changes are greater than the effect of adding
100 more staff to the agency. The distribution of staffing levels is very skewed as a result of
some very large authorities, which means that a change of 100 staff is actually smaller than a
change of one standard deviation (155 staff). Nevertheless, this change is a very considerable
one given that fully half of our observations have fewer than 100 staff, and some agencies get
by with as few as seventeen competition staff (the case of the Austrian Cartel Office in 2004).17
The effect of EU membership is comparable in magnitude to the effect of an increase in inde-
pendence. In practice, the (true, unknown) effect of EU membership is likely to be greater if
membership ‘causes’ countries to increase the level of independence given to their competition
authority.
6 Conclusion and discussion
This study has aimed to assess the impact of two much-discussed institutional features – for-
mal political independence and accountability – on the quality of regulatory decision-making
in competition authorities. Using the GCR ratings of the performance of competition au-
thorities in all OECD member states, and controlling for factors such as the number of staff,
the experience of staff, the powers of the agency, and government effectiveness, our findings
suggest that independence has a positive and significant effect on the quality of regulatory
17 An alternative view is that resources only matter in relation to the extent of work to be carried out by the
competition authority. On this view, what matters is not the level of resources, but their adequacy. We include
in the Online Appendix a model which instead features the number of staff divided by the size of the economy
(Table A3). Yet, operationalized this way, staff numbers are no longer a significant predictor of quality. Yet, the
(natural log of the) overall number of staff still is.
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policy-making. The same is not true of accountability, which does not boost quality, and
which does not seem to mediate the effects of independence.
By focusing on the effects of institutional design on the quality of regulatory decision-making,
this study has moved beyond the existing literature, which has largely concentrated on the
determinants of institutional design rather than their effects. We have been able to take this
step thanks to the use of GCR competition authority ratings. This proxy measure allows
us to capture a wide range of (process-related) elements of the multidimensional concept of
performance, and is therefore much less subject to the biases resulting from capturing some
elements of performance rather than others (cf. Bevan and Hood, 2006), and to the difficulty
of disentangling the effect of organizational features when using outcome-based measures.
Our findings bear out the claim of the early literature on delegation to independent agencies.
Institutions which are more independent tend to do better quality work than institutions
which are less independent. The effect may be mediated by expertise, policy consistency,
or both. The question of whether this improved performance sufficiently justifies removing
competition policy from the scope of normal democratic politics is, of course, a normative
question. But the presumption held by those in favor of delegation has now received stronger
empirical backing.
The findings with respect to accountability are less straightforward to interpret. In our study,
we made a distinction between independence and accountability. We did so both on the basis
of conceptual arguments, and on the basis of previous literature which had suggested that
the designers of independent regulatory agencies could “have their cake and eat it” – that
they could design for high independence and high accountability. Had we found a positive
effect of accountability on quality, then regulatory agencies would have been able to live in
the best of all possible worlds, equipped with high independence, high accountability, and
producing work of high quality. Instead, our findings point to some trade-off between formal
political accountability and performance, though the negative effect of accountability is not
always significant. At the very least, the accountability provisions imposed on competition
authorities do not seem to help the organizations.
As discusssed in Section 5, the question that our study cannot answer is whether this is a
more general problem of accountability or a problem of accountability design. Scholars do
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not unequivocally applaud accountability; they also associate it with red tape and excessive
costs, particularly in the case of standardized and routine requirements (Bovens and Schille-
mans, 2014). Indeed, the accountability arrangements that we found in the statutes of com-
petition authorities fall into the latter category, including standardized provisions on annual
budgets, reports, and financial accounts. Moreover, we have solely captured accountability to
politicians, while there may be reasons to believe that such accountability reintroduces pol-
itics via the back door (cf. Majone, 1999). Our findings may, therefore, support arguments
about the sensitivity of accountability design; at least, we have learned that introducing a set
of generic requirements for political accountability does not have desirable effects. Future
research should pay much more attention to different types of accountability, and potential
differential effects. Is there a difference between the effect of generic and more specific ac-
countability provisions? How do differences in sanctions linked to accountability matter?
And does the effect of political accountability differ from the effect of accountability to other
parties? Addressing these types of questions may lead us to find out whether designing
accountability more carefully can make a difference.
To the extent that our findings support arguments linking accountability to red tape and
excessive costs, they raise the question how desirable accountability really is. In our view, ac-
countability serves more purposes than increasing the quality of regulatory decision-making.
In particular, political accountability is crucial from a perspective of democratic legitimacy.
Regulatory agencies make policies and policy decisions which affect the economy and soci-
ety as a whole, and they do so with a fair amount of discretion. It is precisely under these
conditions that democratic legitimacy becomes relevant. If we want to ensure that regulatory
policies and decisions are still one way or another linked to citizens, we may want to introduce
accountability provisions even if they come at a cost. Nonetheless, if the effect of accountabil-
ity on regulatory quality is dependent on the form that it takes, there is all reason to invest in
analysing and improving the design.
We also stressed that our findings apply to de jure rather than de facto independence and ac-
countability. Agencies may have low de jure accountability, in that they are not compelled by
legislation to report back on their activities, but may have high de facto accountability, in that
they provide such information of their own initiative. It is not clear from our work whether
such ‘voluntary accountability’ (Koop, 2014) on the part of the agency would harm perfor-
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mance. Future research into the links between de facto independence, accountability and
quality will require in-depth examination of agencies’ efforts to make themselves accountable,
and in particular whether agencies’ accountability obligations are discharged in a formalistic
manner, or whether instead they provide an insight into the decision-making process of the
agency and, thereby, foster greater predictability and certainty for market operators.
Finally, we started our research with an interest in the quality of decision-making by inde-
pendent regulatory agencies. Our analysis raises the question to what extent the findings can
‘travel’ to other types of regulatory agencies. In our view, there is no reason to think that the
findings are competition authority-specific. The arguments linking political independence to
better performance are relevant for all regulatory agencies; not just for competition authori-
ties. Equally, all arguments related to accountability – in the theoretical section as well in the
discussion of the results – are more generic. There is one key difference, though: while com-
petition authorities regulate (specific aspects of) the economy as a whole, most other agencies
regulate specific sectors. This increases the importance of analysing the independence of the
regulator from the regulatory sector. While regulators can benefit from interacting with their
regulatees – particularly, in terms of information and expertise –, they may also be captured
by them, leading to a decrease in the quality of decision-making. As such capture is much
more likely in sectoral regulation, independence from the sector may need to be taken into
account in studies of the quality of decision-making by sectoral regulators.
Acknowledgements
We have greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions offered by seminar participants
at the University of Exeter, King’s College London, the Centre for Competition Policy at the
University of East Anglia, the 2014 conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory
Governance, and the 2014 conference on ‘Consequences of Multilevel Governance’ held at the
Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst. We would also like to thank Antje Kreutzman-
Gallasch for help with gathering data on regulators’ statutes, and the Centre for Competition
Policy at the University of East Anglia for funding the data collection. Finally, we would like
to thank the anonymous reviewers, whose comments strengthened the paper a great deal.
34
References
Bawn, K. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative proce-
dures. American Political Science Review, 89(1):62–73.
Bernstein, M. H. (1955). Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Bevan, G. and Hood, C. (2006). What’s measured is what matters: Targets and gaming in the English
public health care system. Public Administration, 84(3):517–538.
Bortolotti, B., Cambini, C., Rondi, L., and Spiegel, Y. (2011). Capital structure and regulation: Do own-
ership and regulatory independence matter? Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20(2):517–
564.
Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. European Law
Journal, 13(4):447–468.
Bovens, M. and Schillemans, T. (2014). Meaningful accountability. In Bovens, M., Goodin, R. E., and
Schillemans, T., editors, The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, pages 673–682. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Busuioc, M. (2009). Accountability, control and independence: The case of European agencies. European
Law Journal, 15(5):599–615.
Cukierman, A., Webb, S. B., and Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the independence of central banks and
its effect on policy outcomes. World Bank Economic Review, 6(3):353–398.
Dewatripont, M., Jewitt, I., and Tirole, J. (1999). The economics of career concerns, part II: Application
to missions and accountability of government agencies. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1):199–217.
Dubnick, M. J. and Frederickson, H. (2011). Introduction. In Dubnick, M. J. and Frederickson, H. G.,
editors, Accountable Governance: Problems and Promises, pages xi–xxx. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Edwards, G. and Waverman, L. (2006). The effects of public ownership and regulatory independence
on regulatory outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29(1):23–67.
Elgie, R. and McMenamin, I. (2005). Credible commitments, political uncertainty or political com-
plexity? Explaining variation in the independence of non-majoritarian institutions in France. British
Journal of Political Science, 35(3):531–548.
Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2015). Credibility versus control: Agency independence and partisan influence
in the regulatory state. Comparative Political Studies, 48(7):823–853.
35
Gailmard, S. and Patty, J. W. (2007). Slackers and zealots: Civil service, policy discretion, and bureau-
cratic expertise. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4):873–889.
Gilardi, F. (2002). Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: A comparative
empirical analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6):873–893.
Gilardi, F. (2005). The institutional foundations of regulatory capitalism: The diffusion of independent
regulatory agencies in Western Europe. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
598:84–101.
Global Competition Review (2005). Rating Enforcement 2005. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2006). Rating Enforcement 2006. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2007). Rating Enforcement 2007. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2008). Rating Enforcement 2008. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2011). Rating Enforcement 2011. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2012). Rating Enforcement 2012. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2014). Rating Enforcement 2014. London: Law Business Research.
Global Competition Review (2015). Rating Enforcement 2015. London: Law Business Research.
Gutiérrez, L. H. (2003). The effect of endogenous regulation on telecommunications expansion and
efficiency in Latin America. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 23(3):257–286.
Hanretty, C. and Koop, C. (2012). Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies. Journal
of European Public Policy, 19(2):198–216.
Hanretty, C. and Koop, C. (2013). Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of
regulatory agencies. Regulation & Governance, 7(2):195–214.
Hood, C. and Bevan, G. (2006). What’s measured is what matters: Targets and gaming in the English
public health care system. Public Administration, 84(3):517–538.
Huber, J. D. and McCarty, N. (2004). Bureaucratic capacity, delegation, and political reform. American
Political Science Review, 98(3):481–494.
Jackman, S. (2009). Bayesian Analysis for the Social Sciences. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Jordana, J., Levi-Faur, D., and Fernández i Marín, X. (2011). The global diffusion of regulatory agencies:
Channels of transfer and stages of diffusion. Comparative Political Studies, 44(10):1343–1369.
36
Jordana, J. and Rosas, G. (2014). When do autonomous banking regulators promote stability? European
Journal of Political Research, 53(4):672–691.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The worldwide governance indicators: Methodol-
ogy and analytical issues. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 5430.
Koop, C. (2011). Explaining the accountability of independent agencies: The importance of political
salience. Journal of Public Policy, 31(2):209–234.
Koop, C. (2014). Theorizing and explaining voluntary accountability. Public Administration, 92(3):565–
581.
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal
plans. Journal of Political Economy, 85(3):473–492.
Lerner, J. S. and Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. Psychological Bulletin,
125(2):255.
Levy, B. and Spiller, P. T. (1996). Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecom-
munications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Loewenstein, K. (1957). Political Power and the Governmental Process. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Maggetti, M. and Gilardi, F. (2014). Network governance and the domestic adoption of soft rules.
Journal of European Public Policy, 21(9):1293–1310.
Maggetti, M., Ingold, K., and Varone, F. (2013). Having your cake and eating it, too: Can regulatory
agencies be both independent and accountable? Swiss Political Science Review, 19(1):1–25.
Majone, G. (1996). Temporal consistency and policy credibility: Why democracies need non-
majoritarian institutions. EUI Working Paper, RSC No 96/57.
Majone, G. (1997). From the positive to the regulatory state: Causes and consequences of changes in
the mode of governance. Journal of Public Policy, 17(2):139–167.
Majone, G. (1999). The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems. West European Politics, 22(1):1–24.
May, P. J. (2007). Regulatory regimes and accountability. Regulation & Governance, 1(1):8–26.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R., and Weingast, B. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of
political control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 3(2):243–277.
Mero, N. P. and Motowidlo, S. J. (1995). Effects of rater accountability on the accuracy and the favora-
bility of performance ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 80(4):517–524.
37
Moe, T. M. (2012). Delegation, control, and the study of public bureaucracy. In Gibbons, R. and Roberts,
J., editors, The Handbook of Organizational Economics, pages 1148–1182. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Patil, S. V., Vieider, F., and Tetlock, P. E. (2014). Process versus outcome accountability. In Bovens, M.,
Goodin, R. E., and Schillemans, T., editors, The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, pages 69–89.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philp, M. (2009). Delimiting democratic accountability. Political Studies, 57(1):28–53.
Quintyn, M. and Taylor, M. W. (2007). Robust regulators and their political masters: Independence and
accountability in theory. In Masciandaro, D. and Quintyn, M., editors, Designing Financial Supervision
Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance, pages 3–40. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
Radaelli, C. (2004). Getting to grips with quality in the diffusion of regulatory impact assessment in
Europe. Public Money and Management, 24(5):271–276.
Raju, N. S., Laffitte, L. J., and Byrne, B. M. (2002). Measurement equivalance: A comparison of meth-
ods based on confirmatory factor analysis and item response theory. Journal of Applied Psychology,
87(3):517–529.
Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 100(4):1169–1189.
Samejima, F. (1970). Estimation of latent ability using a response pattern of graded scores. Psychome-
trika, 35(1):139–139.
Schwab, K. and Sala-i Marin, X. (2015). The global competitiveness report, 2015–2016.
Scott, C. (2000). Accountability in the regulatory state. Journal of Law and Society, 27(1):38–60.
Selin, J. (2015). What makes an agency independent? American Journal of Political Science, 59(4):971–987.
Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Accountability and the perseverance of first impressions. Social Psychology Quar-
terly, 46(4):285–292.
Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error. Social Psy-
chology Quarterly, 48(3):227–236.
Thatcher, M. (2005). The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in
Europe. Governance, 18(3):347–373.
38
Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A. (2002). Theory and practice of delegation to non-majoritarian insti-
tutions. West European Politics, 25(1):1–22.
Wallsten, S. J. (2001). An econometric analysis of telecom competition, privatization, and regulation in
Africa and Latin America. Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(1):1–19.
Weldon, E. and Gargano, G. M. (1988). Cognitive loafing the effects of accountability and shared
responsibility on cognitive effort. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14(1):159–171.
39
